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The Power of Awards
Abstract: Every economist worth his or her salt will tell you that monetary 
compensation is more efficient than all other forms of rewards. Awards have 
only received scant attention in the economics literature. Yet, they are ubiqui-
tous. They can take many forms and include titles, prizes, orders, medals, and 
still other types of decorations. We outline the distinguishing characteristics of 
awards, especially in comparison to monetary rewards, show the potential risks 
and emphasize where awards are particularly useful.
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1  Introduction
Every economist worth his or her salt will tell you that monetary compensation 
is more efficient than all other forms of rewards. Money is fungible and therefore 
yields most utility to the recipient. It can be applied marginally, such that the 
desired performance can (in theory) be directly induced. A second type of material 
reward is non-monetary and takes the form of fringe benefits such as a company car 
or a particularly attractive office. These incentives are less efficient but can never-
theless be widely observed. This can at least partly be explained by the tax-related 
advantages they provide. More recently, intrinsic motivation has been considered 
as a work incentive. A fourth category – awards – has received only little atten-
tion by economists. Exceptions are Hansen and Weisbrod’s article in the Journal 
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of Political Economy and Besley’s unpublished “Notes on Honours.” Awards can 
take many forms and include titles, prizes, orders, medals, and still other types of 
decorations. They clearly are extrinsic incentives, though not of a material kind.
Awards are ubiquitous in practice. They are bestowed in great numbers by 
heads of state – monarchs, presidents and chancellors alike. The cultural sector 
is characterized by award ceremonies such as the Oscars or Grammys. Success in 
sports is crowned with medals, trophies and titles like that of the Sportsperson of 
the Year. Managers are elected CEO of the Year, while workers strive to be named 
Employee of the Month. Academics are eager to receive awards, too, ranging from 
honorary doctorates to Fellowships of prestigious academic societies [e.g., Fellow 
of the Royal Society, or Fellow of the Econometric Society, which is analyzed in 
an article by Chan, Frey and Gallus (2014)]. Even the Catholic Church relies on an 
elaborate system of honors, including post-mortem awards such as notably the 
canonizations, which have in recent years been made great use of. As shown in a 
working paper by Barro, McCleary, and McQuoid, the beatification rate (the ratio 
of the number of beatified persons to a pope’s tenure) reached 12 for John Paul II 
(1978–2005), while it had only been between 0 and 2 up until his tenure. Similar 
increases in the number of awards bestowed are discernible in many areas.
2   Difference between Monetary Compensation 
and Awards
Awards differ from pecuniary incentives in several ways. From the point of 
view of the economic theory of incentives the following aspects are of primary 
importance.
Giving awards is cheap. In the case of awards it is only non-monetary costs 
that matter. Awards normally consist in a piece of ribbon, a trophy or a document 
that can be displayed in the office. However, if too many awards are handed out 
they lose their value. Choosing an unworthy candidate produces considerable 
costs for the giver because of the resulting image loss. The reputation of the World 
Wildlife Fund, for instance, was harmed when its Honorary President, the King of 
Spain, was caught hunting elephants and needed to have his title revoked.
In a few cases awards are accompanied by a large prize purse. The winner 
of an (undivided) Nobel Prize gets eight million Swedish kronor (more than one 
million U.S. dollars). Yet the honor going with the Prize is far more important 
than the money. It can safely be assumed that most scholars would be glad to 
accept the Prize even if no money was attached to it – or that they would even 
be prepared to pay for it. An important function of the money accompanying an 
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award lies in establishing its seriousness. However, the sum of money is no guar-
antee that a prize will enjoy commensurate prestige. Thus, the Balzan Prize for 
Humanity, Peace and Fraternity Among Peoples, bestowed every 3–5 years, enjoys 
far lower prestige than the Nobel Prize though the winner receives even 2 million 
Swiss francs (more than 2 million U.S. dollars).
Where performance can only be vaguely determined, awards have a compar-
ative advantage over monetary incentives. “Performance pay” is appropriate only 
if the performance criteria are precisely determined and measured. This prerequi-
site is, however, rarely met in the case of complex activities, as argued by Oster-
loh and Frey in an article in Organization Science. If variable performance pay is 
applied, the giver must concentrate on those parts of the performance that are 
measurable. As a result, the potential recipients are induced to behave in a stra-
tegic way and perform well only in those dimensions that are measured. For this 
reason, principal agent theory increasingly favors “encompassing” performance 
evaluations. Under some conditions, as shown by Holmström and Milgrom in 
the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, it is even better not to provide 
any explicit incentives. In that case, work effort is upheld only if work morale 
happens to stay high.
Awards can be used when monetary compensation would induce strategic 
behavior. They allow the principal to take into account non-contractible activi-
ties, such as helping a colleague. Awards are meant to honor general forms of per-
formance, as is the case with Lifetime Achievement Awards given, for example, at 
film festivals. In many cases, the Nobel Prize is bequeathed for a life’s work rather 
than for a specific research success achieved in the preceding year (although this 
would correspond to the original intent of the founder).
Awards fulfill an important signaling function, which is analyzed in detail in a 
paper by Frey and Gallus (2014). They are particularly valuable for their recipients 
when revealing their talent and commitment, allowing award winners to engage 
in beneficial new commercial and personal relationships. By bequeathing awards, 
the givers also send signals about themselves. They can use the awards to show 
which values they honor. Given the publicity and the important ceremonial com-
ponent of award programs, they can also be employed for public relations aims.
Under specific conditions, monetary payments reduce work effort. They 
crowd out intrinsic motivation if performance measurement is perceived as con-
trolling. If this crowding-out effect is stronger than the relative price effect, the 
incentive will even induce a decrease in performance. Giving money may more-
over distort the positive signaling effect of “good deeds.” It becomes unclear 
whether the action was undertaken for its own sake, or with the goal of receiving 
the money in return. The net effect on performance therefore can be positive or 
negative. These considerations constitute a considerable extension of standard 
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economic theory. In contrast to monetary compensation, awards tend to foster 
intrinsic motivation. They neither require an explicit performance measurement, 
nor do they negatively affect the recipient’s self-evaluation or reduce the latter’s 
self-determination. Rather, awards support their recipients’ activities as well as 
their self-image.
Awards also forge special ties of loyalty. A recipient of an award enters a bond 
of loyalty with the giver. Outsiders would consider accepting an award but then 
turning against the giver as being inconsistent. The respective person should 
have refused the award if he or she does not agree with the general views held 
by the giver. The giver also accepts to establish special ties to the recipient. His or 
her prestige suffers if the recipient proves to be unworthy or rejects the award. For 
these reasons, award givers carefully check whether the potential recipients are 
worthy and whether they are likely to accept the award.
Monetary payments do not establish any such bond of loyalty above and 
beyond the performance contracted. In many cases people emphasize that they 
perform a particular task solely for the money, and that they have no further con-
nection or obligation to the person giving the money.
3  Awards Raise Welfare
Honoring a person serves to bolster the norms of others undertaking similar 
activities or upholding similar attitudes. These persons experience an improved 
self-evaluation and rise in the regard of third parties, which increases their utility. 
Moreover, awards can substitute for other means of getting social approval, such 
as luxury consumption, which induces negative external effects. Awards change 
the implicit relative price in favor of the activities they honor. They are often 
used to remunerate social engagements. This allows persons engaging in similar 
activities to identify themselves with the award recipients and “bask in reflected 
glory.” The many awards received by Mother Teresa may serve as an example. 
Honoring a person for his or her performance moreover shifts the reference point 
of other persons for their own behavior. This effect can increase effort in the activ-
ity concerned.
4  Potential Risks
As awards need to be kept scarce so that they retain their value, many persons 
will not be honored. Especially in the context of organizations, where the group 
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of candidates who might have been awarded is clearly delineated, this risks 
entailing negative reactions by non-recipients. Lower job satisfaction and per-
formance, refusal to cooperate, or outright sabotage may be the result. For award 
bestowals to have a positive aggregate effect, givers need to take this risk into 
account and make corresponding adjustments to the awards they employ (e.g., 
with respect to the number, frequency, and variety of awards bestowed).
5  Where are Awards Particularly Useful?
Awards have a comparative advantage if the conditions for performance pay – 
encompassing and precise performance measurement – can be fulfilled only at 
high cost, or not at all, or if a marked crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation 
is to be expected. Awards therefore play an important role in the voluntary sector.
Awards are, of course, unsuitable in many situations – as are other extrinsic 
incentives.
The gist of this contribution is to question the materially oriented focus on 
motivation and incentives. Non-monetary rewards, in particular providing honor 
through awards, should be accorded more attention in the economics literature. 
The stress on monetary rewards as the most important driver of motivation is ill- 
conceived. Rather than focusing on variations of material incentives, decision-
makers should think about how to motivate people by conferring honors.
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